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 Introduction 
Pollution from nonpoint sources (NPS), and agriculture in particular, remains as 
one of the largest sources of water quality impairments in the United States. As is well 
known in the literature, there are many difficulties with designing regulations for 
reducing nonpoint source pollution (i.e., Tomasi, Segerson, and Braden, 1994). 
Uncertainty and asymmetric information are the key regulatory difficulties that have been 
identified for developing effective economic mechanisms to control  nonpoint source 
pollution. The main goal of this paper is to describe a potential incentive mechanism that 
can be applied in limited information situations, such as nonpoint source pollution. The 
incentive mechanism involves a contract written between a point source of pollution and 
a small group of other nonpoint polluters in the watershed to reduce a specific load of 
pollution. The contract allows the nonpoint sources to enter the contract voluntarily.  To 
handle the incentive problems typical in many principal agent problems, it incorporates 
joint liability, and peer pressure/monitoring to induce the nonpoint sources of pollution to 
meet their contractual obligations.   
   The contract proposed here is built upon the ideas of Stiglitz (1990) and Varian 
(1990) that were originally applied to micro-lending arrangements in developing 
countries.  As we hypothesize with nonpoint source pollution, joint liability contracts for 
micro-lending assume that individuals have more information about each other than the 
principal has about them.  Given the likelihood for moral hazard in contracts with 
asymetric information, the contract proposed in this paper takes advantage of joint 
liability and peer pressure to eliminate or reduce the moral hazard problem.  Joint liability contracts have been shown to be successfully applied in practice in several situations 
(Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Van Tassel, 1999).  
For our purposes, a principal (a point source of pollution) offers a contract that 
specifies a price for each ton of pollution abated by individuals who participate.  The 
contract is offered to individual farmers in a specified sub-watershed upstream from the 
discharge point.  Farmers in the watershed decide whether or not to participate, and if 
they decide to participate, they bid into the contract the level of abatement services they 
will provide. The principal will form the group from these bidders, and will agree to pay 
the farmers if they meet the group’s overall target.  The bids determine the sharing rule 
for payments at the end of the season.    
   To show how a group contract with peer pressure could be applied to the non 
point source pollution, three contracts are explored.  The paper begins with a simple 
problem that ignores asymetric information.  This model is then contrasted with a second 
model that incorporates asymetric information and a third model that allows for peer 
pressure. The results show that without peer pressure, one of the incentive compatability 
constraints is not met, suggesting that individual farmers would revert to low effort in 
most cases. Increase in fixed payment can also induce farmers to shirk. The results 
suggest that contracts that incorporate peer pressure and take advantage farmer 
interactions among their neighbors can avoid the typical problems associated with moral 
hazard. Without peer pressure, farmers have little to no incentive to achieve pollution 
abatement goals.  We speculate that peer pressure is more likely to evolve in situations 
where farmers are all located in the same small watershed and where they have frequent interactions with each other, and potentially can observe their neighbors actions during 
the year. 
In addition to exploring the role of peer pressure in avoiding the moral hazard 
problems associated with non point source pollution control contracts, we also explore 
the trade-offs between participation in the contract and shirking.  At one extreme, 
existing voluntary incentive programs involve fixed payments with no requirements for 
performance.  They will thus lead to high levels of participation, but likely to large levels 
of shirking as well. For example, in a typical year all of the money available for existing 
federal conservation programs is used by farmers, but there is little evidence available to 
prove that pollution declines as a result.  The second contract explored in this paper 
shows how large fixed payments, as currently used, are likely to lead to small 
improvements in pollution. At the other extreme, one could write a contract that specifies 
that payments will only be made if the target is met, following Holmstrom (1982) or 
Segerson (1988).  Such an extreme, nonlinear contract such as this likely would eliminate 
most shirking, but it may lead to little participation among farmers. In this paper, it is 
shown that it is possible to increase the fixed payment in order to increase participation if 
peer pressure is a viable component of the contract.  
Results also indicate that fixed payment proportion from the total payment can be 
larger in regions where farmers have high costs and high reservation utilities. Moreover, 
peer monitoring can be lower in regions where there are high nonpecuniary penalties and 




To date, performance-based programs have rarely been used to control non point 
source pollution.  For the most part, controls rely on voluntary incentive programs that 
make payments regardless of the actual reductions in pollution attained. This is 
problematic for point sources who may wish to purchase pollution abatement reduction 
credits from nonpoint sources.  There are few contract mechanisms available to provide 
point sources with assurances that pollution abatement will actually occur if they make 
payments for technological improvements in nonpoint sources.  This study shows that 
under certain circumstances, it is possible to develop performance-based approaches that 
can be the basis for contracting between point and non-point sources.   
To show this, a group contract is proposed with voluntary participation.  The 
basic idea behind this mechanism is to delegate individual monitoring and enforcement to 
the group members since they live in close proximity and have more knowledge about 
each other than principal. Once the principal convinces the agents to participate in this 
contract by providing an adequate incentive, the contract operates to eliminate the moral 
hazard problems typical in many contracts with asymmetric information.  The principal’s 
job is to offer a contract with enough incentives and form a group, to monitor the 
pollution abatement that arises from group efforts, and to make payments based on that.   
I.  Symmetric Information Contract/Individual Contract 
The paper first shows a contract under perfect conditions where principal and 
agents
* have the same information available to each other. Such would be the case if the 
individual contributions and cost functions from each source could be observed perfectly. 
                                                 
* The terms principal and agents refers to point source polluter and farmers, respectively. In this case agent doesn’t have any information advantage to use against the principal, 
i.e., no moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Since the principal can 
observe/verify the individuals’ actions/efforts, the contract can be an individual contract 
and based on the effort level. The principal must decide both the effort that she demands 
from the agent, and subsidy/payment that will be paid based on the result.  The results 
from this kind of contract will show us what the optimal payment mechanism is under 
different risk preferences. 
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will bea , given the agent’s effort level ‘e’. 
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mc: marginal cost of abatement for the point source 
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U   : Agent’s reservation utility 
This problem establishes that the principal maximizes the surplus that she obtains 
from the relationship, under one condition which is called participation constraint, or the 
individual rationality condition. This condition says that the agent can always reject the 
contract if what he gets by signing it is not at least equal to what he can obtain from the 
alternatives in the market. 
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When we apply the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, we can see that the multiplier 
associated with participation condition must be strictly positive, given our assumptions. 
That means participation constraint binds, which is intuitive. If it didn’t bind, then the 
principal would be paying ‘too much’ to the agent. In this case, the principal can reduce 
the payment to the agent in such a way that the agent would still accept the contract, and 
the principal would get greater utility, which is called Pareto Optimum. 
Optimal Payment Mechanism 
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 This equation indicates that the ratio of marginal utilities of the principal and the 
agent should be constant whatever the final result is. In order to better understand the 
implications of this condition, let’s take a look at following four cases: 
i.  If U’(.)=constant, that is, the principal is risk-neutral, the efficiency condition 
above requires that u’(s
o(ai))=constant for all i. If  the agent is risk-averse, the 
only possible way in which the marginal utilities at two points can be the same is 
if the two points are the same. In other words, u’(s
o(ai))= u’(s
o(aj)) requires that 
s
o(ai)= s
o(aj). Therefore, at the optimal contract the agent receives a pay-off that is 
independent of the result. The optimal distribution of risk when the principal is 
risk-neutral is for her to accept all the risk, completely insuring the agent. The 
agent receives the same payment in all contingencies, and this payment will only 
depend on the effort demanded. So, the exact payment will be: 
)) ( (
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− , since we know that participation constraint binds. 
ii.  If both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral, the result will be very similar 
to the previous one. The agent can still get the fixed payment, since both U’(.) and 
u’(s
o(ai)) are constants. By the same token, the payment will be:  ) (
o o e c U s + =  
iii.  If the agent is risk-neutral, u’(.)=constant, and the principal is risk-averse, 
U’’(.)<0, then we are in the opposite situation. The optimal contract will require 
that U’(mc*ai- s
o(ai))=constant for all i. That means, mc*ai - s
o(ai) = mc*ai - s
o(aj). 
this time the principal’s profit is independent of the result. Consequently, the 
agent accepts all the risk, insuring the principal against variation in the result. The 
optimal contract is of the form: s
o(ai) = mc*ai – k.  We can interpret this as a ‘franchise’ contract: the agent keeps the result ai and 
pays the principal a fixed amount k, independent of the result. In order that the 
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The amount that the principal sets as the price for the agent to keep the result is 
the difference between the expected profit from the activity and the amount 
required for agent to accept the relationship. 
iv.  If both the principal and the agent are risk-averse, each one will need to accept a 
part of the variability (risk) of the result. Exactly how much will depend on their 
degrees of risk-aversion. The optimal contracts in this case can be very 
complicated. A rather attractive, for simplicity, contract format is the set of linear 
contracts: s
o(ai) = k + b(mc*ai ) 
II.  Asymmetric Information Case 
The second model in this paper explores the effect of moral hazard on the 
problem.  In this case, the principal cannot observe/verify the agents contributions or cost 
functions so that contract cannot based on the effort level. The principal can, however, 
observe total abatement level. That makes the group contract more suitable for nonpoint 
source pollution. The principal’s job will be to specify the payment mechanism, offer the 
contract and observe the total output. Agents will decide whether to participate or not. If 
they participate, they must additionally decide whether to exert high or low effort. For the rest of the paper we will assume that both principal and agents are risk 
neutral. However, since we have a moral hazard problem within the group, we cannot 
offer a full fixed payment as in the symmetric information case. If the principal offers just 
fixed payment, no matter the result is, then it is obvious that agents will put the lowest 
effort. The payment mechanism we offer will be linear and depend on the group 
performance. This is more like when both principal and agents are risk-averse case in 
symmetric case. When the group meets the target, they will get fixed payment plus some 
bonus; otherwise they will get just the fixed payment. 
1.  Joint Liability Group Contract Model without Peer Pressure 
Here is step by step how this joint liability group contract works: 
1.  Principal offers the contract to the agents in a particular watershed. The contract 
specifies the price per ton abatement, payment mechanism and total ambient level 
abatement required. 
2.  Agents are free to accept or reject the contract. It is completely voluntary. If an 
agent rejects the contract, he will be out of group and will not be responsible for 
any abatement or payment. However, if an agent agrees to the contract, then he is 
going to bid how many tons he is willing to abate. So all the agents who want to 
join the contract will bid the amount they will produce. 
3.  Principal will form a group amongst these bidders up until he reaches the total 
amount he is looking for. If he cannot get enough amounts of bids, then he can 
form a group with those bidders, or he can just withdraw the contract. If he gets 
more total bids than he is looking for, then he can develop a mechanism to form a 
group. For example, he can randomly choose group members, or start from the highest bidder or lowest bidder until he meets his target level abatement. Or those 
bidders can self-select the group members they want to be and form the group. 
4.  Now the season starts, and farmers are free to obey their bids or they can produce 
less or more than they bid. Off course, producing more means extra cost to 
farmers, or vice versa. But producing more is also increasing the probability of 
meeting the target as a group since it may cover the random weather effect, or part 
of shirking members’ portion. It is obvious that an agent can only produce more 
up to some point where his marginal cost equals his marginal revenue, i.e., per ton 
abatement price.  
On the other hand, farmers need to consider several issues when they want to 
produce less, i.e., moral hazard. First of all, his payment is also depent on group 
performance. So if he shirks, that means there is a less chance for group to meet 
the target and get the payment. He will be worse off doing that when he had some 
abatement costs. If he didn’t do anything and had no abatement cost, then he will 
be indifferent.  
5.  Once everybody in the group decide how many tons to produce at the beginning (I 
assume that all decisions made before the season starts since most abatement 
practices are one time applications such as filter strips or no-till), season will start 
and they will start using abatement practices they believe best fits for them.  
6.  At the end of the season, principal will measure the ambient abatement level. If it 
is more than or equal to target level, then everybody will get the payment. 
Payment for each agent will be some fixed payment plus his bid amount times the 
price per ton of abatement. So it is a deterministic payment for each agent. No matter what they produce they will get the same payment as long as they meet the 
target. However, if they cannot meet the target as a group, then group will only 
get some fixed payment. The reason for having this kind of payment mechanism 
is the difficulty of distributing the total payment among the group members. It is 
very hard to come up with a sharing rule in this kind of situation where you 
cannot verify the individual contributions. 
As can be seen from the structure of the contract, principal doesn’t have any 
moral hazard problem. They cannot cheat as a group over principal. However, moral 
hazard problem exists within the group.  
As for adverse selection problem, we believe that having bidding notion in the 
contract can sort out that problem because only those farmers who have abatement costs 
less than price per ton abatement will bid in. That means, only those farmers who doesn’t 
currently use available or best abatement practices or technology will join the contract. 
This is what principal is looking for.  
Even if there is still some adverse selection problem exists, we would like to 
ignore it because only solution to adverse selection problem is to offer separate contract 
for each type of agent. Let say we have more than one contract offered to the farmers. 
Some will accept the one, some will the other’s. That means we have more than one 
group in one watershed area. This will take back to the same problem we had at the first 
place, which is identifying the individual contribution. In this case we need to identify the 
contribution of each group in order to decide their performance and payment. So having 
more than one group in a watershed is similar to having individual contracts for NPS, 
which is not applicable.  Assumptions: 
For simplicity, one principal and two identical agent case will be analyzed in this 
paper.  Principal has the all the bargaining power, i.e., he offers the contract to the agents 
and agents are free to take it or leave it. In this contract principal is going to specify the 
payment mechanism and total abatement he is looking for from the group.  
Other Assumptions: 
•  All decisions are made before the season starts.  
•  Everybody in the group has the same probability of success and failure. 
•  Principal and agents are risk-neutral 
•  Individuals who are not in the group will behave the same as before the contract. So 
there is no negative or positive effect of non-group members. 
•  Group member can produce abatement from zero to some positive numbers but not 
negative, i.e., they won’t pollute more than before. 
•  Two outcomes: 1) Desired and above, 2) Less than desired  
•  Two effort level: High and Low 
•  Random weather effect 
•  No adverse selection problem  
Payment Mechanism 
Although both principal and agents are risk-neutral, existence of moral hazard 
problem within the group prevents the principal from offering agents all fixed payments 
(independent from the outcomes), as in the symmetric case above. If he does that, agents 
will get the fixed payment with lowest possible effort. That is why the payment has to be 
somehow based on the outcome. For simplicity, linear payment scheme, i.e. fixed payment plus bonus, has been used in this paper. This is more like similar to both the 
principal and agent are risk-averse case in symmetric information model. We have two 
outcomes, and two states that payments depend upon: If the total ambient abatement level 
is equal to or more than the target level (i.e., group is successful), each agent will get 
some fixed payment plus bonus. Otherwise, they will only get the fixed payment. 
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 s k: Total payment to the agent k. 
 S
T: Total maximum payment that an agent can get 
  Fk: The amount of fixed payment to the agent k. 
  Bk: The amount of bonus payment to the agent k. 
  A: Aggregate actual ambient abatement level 
  A
b: Total bid amount of the group 
  p: Price of abatement per ton 
  a
b: abatement bid amount of an agent 
  ω : Random variable (i.e., weather) 
  q: Proportion allocated to fixed payment from total maximum payment (S
T). Agent 1’s expected utilities (EU):   
•  When both choose HIGH effort: 
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Where, 
Pr
ij: The probability of being successful as a group when both agents exerts efforts i and 
j, respectively. Where i, j = H, L  
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The results above show the effect of change in proportion allocated to fixed 
payment (q) on the expected utilities of the agent 1. When the constraint (8) is applied to 
these results, it can easily be seen that change in q affects the most equation 3 and then 2, 
and finally 1. That means, any increase in fixed payment (i.e., decrease in bonus 
payment) will increase expected utility the most when both agents puts low efforts 
compare to other cases. In other words, after some point, any increase in q will encourage 
agents to choose low effort, free-riding problem. This clearly shows how increase in 
fixed payment lead to free-riding.  
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mc: Marginal cost of abatement for point source 
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f: Aggregate actual ambient abatement level if the group fails (A
f <A
b) 
BT: Total bonus payment to the group 
FT: Total fixed payment to the group 
 Incentive Compatibility (IC) Constraints: 
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  Note that constraints 5 and 7 contradicts. That means constraint 5 will never be 
met. So agent will not have enough incentive to choose high effort when the other agent 
chooses low effort. In this case he would prefer to put low effort, too. This shows us that 
a rational agent will never choose to exert high effort without knowing that the other 
agent also exerts high effort. Another important point to make is that even if the principal 
gives agents zero fixed payment, without having some kind of enforcement within the 
group such as peer monitoring, they will not have enough incentive to put high effort. 
Positive fixed payment especially important for agents’ participation. 
This result is similar to current Command and Control programs and Best 
Management Practices. Farmers are forced/agreed upon applying some practices in their farm, but there is no strict monitoring on farmers. So, they have incentive to get the 
subsidy and shirk.  
2.  Joint Liability Group Contract Model with Peer Pressure 
  Previous model suggests that moral hazard within the group cannot be solved 
without some form of enforcement occurring within the group. As proposed in 
development finance, peer pressure and social sanctions can potentially be a useful form 
of peer enforcement within a region. The idea of having monitored and using 
nonpecuniary penalties by the group members will discourage agents to shirk and 
eliminate/reduce the moral hazard problem in the group. 
 
Similar kind of joint liability group contracts have also been successfully used in 
micro-finance in developing countries, called group lending. The underlying idea of 
group lending is to delegate monitoring and enforcement activities to borrowers 
themselves. Borrowers who know a lot about each other, such as those live in close 
proximity or socialize in the same circles, are the most promising candidates for group 
lending. They can be better able to apply social pressure on potential defaulters (Prescott, 
1997). A major source of market failure in credit markets is that a bank cannot apply 
financial sanctions against poor people who default on a loan, since by definition they are 
poor. Poor people’s neighbors, on the other hand, may be able to impose powerful non-
financial sanctions at low cost. 
We believe that this kind of mechanism can be successfully applied in nonpoint 
source pollution, as well. The reasons for that are first of all it is obvious that farmers 
have more information about each other than the principal. Second, they live in close proximity and can monitor each other more easily and cheaply. They have relatively 
stronger social ties that they don’t want to lose. The main difference between group 
lending and nonpoint source pollution is that in group lending each agent has independent 
production activity and at the end of the period s/he reveals his/her success or failure. 
During this period of time agents monitor each other since they have jointly liable. Each 
agent gets a credit from the bank at the beginning of the period. If he is successful at the 
end, he pays his debt plus some portions of the other agent’s debt who fails.  
On the other hand, in nonpoint source pollution, there is a joint production, and 
agents’ payment depends on the total group production. If the group is successful, 
everybody gets fixed payment plus bonus at the end. If the group fails, just the fixed 
payement. 
Having said that, the only difference between previous model and this model is 
that agents use peer pressure by monitoring each other during the season and using some 
social sactions (cutting out from the group, losing reputation, losing future income from 
the contract) if they catch someone shirking. In this section, we will show that peer 
pressure can make this group contract work by solving the moral hazard problem within 
the group. So it is crucial to have some kind of peer pressure in order group contract to 
work. Otherwise, it will return to the previous case where moral hazard exists. 
Additional Assumptions: 
•  Peer monitoring decisions are taken before the realization of returns. 
•  Agents who put low effort get punished, if they get caught, by some exogenous 
nonpecuniary penalty (M) and lose their future revenues (V) from the project by not 
being in the group for future seasons. •  Shirking agents will be punished, if they get caught, even if the group is successful. 
Agent 1’s expected utilities (EU):   
•  When both choose HIGH effort: 
) ( ] * Pr [ 1 1 1 1 a C B F EU
H HH HH − + =  
•  When he chooses HIGH effort and the other LOW effort: 
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•  When he chooses LOW effort and the other HIGH effort: 
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L LH LH + − − + = γ  
•  When both choose LOW effort: 
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Where, 
M: Monetary value of peer pressure on agent ‘k’ by other agents. 
V: Future revenue loss of the agent by shirking and being out of the group for next 
seasons. For static model we are going to assume that this is a exogenous variable. 
γ : Probability of being monitored and getting caught. 
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Note that when the constraint 5 is met, the other 4 IC constraints automatically 
met, too. So, it is enough for us to take only 5 as an IC constraint. Another point to worth 
mention is that as long as the group has big enough peer pressure, the agents will have 
enough incentive to put high effort no matter what other agents do. 
Participation Constraint: 
(6)  U EU
HH ≥ 1  →  U ) ( ] * Pr 1 1 1 ≥ − + a C B F
H HH [   
Other Constraints 




k a C a >
(8) 




) ( ) (
  Eq.3)
) ( ) ( ) (
) (   (w.r.t.
* ) 1 ( * Pr *
U ) (
  Eq.2)
) Pr 1 ( *
* * Pr U ) (
  Eq.1)
U ) ( ] * * ) 1 ( * Pr * * [
) (   (w.r.t.  
0 2
) Pr 1 ( *
) Pr 1 ( * 2
0 * * Pr * * 2 * 2 Pr
(q)   (w.r.t.    F.O.C.
) ( ) ( ) (     U ) ( ] * * ) 1 ( * Pr * * [                      
* * 2 )] * )( Pr 1 ( ) * ) 1 ( 2 * ( [Pr ) , , ({








a C a C
a C V M a C





a p a C
q
a C a p q a p q
a p
a p
a p a p a p a p
a C V M a C a C a p q a p q







H b HH b
HH b
HH b
b HH b b b HH
H L H b HH b
















= − + −
− + + + − − − + +










These results suggest that joint liability group contracts can be applied under 
some conditions. (Eq.1) gives us the optimum portion that needs to be allocated for fixed 
payment. As can be seen from the equation, any increase in C
H(.) and reservation utility, 
increases q, too. This is very intuitive. If an agent has higher abatement cost and 
reservation utility, proportion that allocated for fixed payment (q) expected to be higher, 
too. On the other hand, increase in the price per ton abatement (p) will decrease q. This is 
also very logical because increase in price also increases the fixed payment. However, in 
order to have stable fixed payment increase in the price (p) can be adjusted by decreasing 
the portion of the fixed payment (q). (Eq.2) gives us the optimum price per ton. This is basically restatement of the 
equation 1. Equation 2 shows that increase in C
H(.) and reservation utility, increases p, as 
well. This is also an expected result since a high cost and reservation utility agent will 
demand higher amount of price from the principal in order to join the contract. p and q 
relation is the same as explained before. 
As for the (Eq.3), minimum required monitoring rate supposed to be the ratio of 
difference between high and low cost, and total social sanctions imposed (M+V). This 
equation show that increase in C
H(.), increases monitoring rate (γ), too. That is, high cost 
agents will have more incentive to monitor other agents in order to discourage them from 
shirking. On the other hand, an increase in C
L(.), decreases monitoring rate (γ). The idea 
behind this can be very well the agent who put low effort but has higher cost relative to 
those who put low effort and lower cost would prefer lower rate of monitoring because if 
he gets caught he will be worse off (his loss will be more because of both higher 
abatement cost and social sanctions compare to the low cost agent). Finally, an increase 
in social sanctions (M+V) will decrease the rate of monitoring (γ). This makes sense 
since having very high social sanctions will have more effect on the agents for not to 
shirk, which makes required monitoring less needed.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates a mechanism that works better for nonpoint source 
pollution. First of all it is based on the performance not design-based approach. This will 
lead to direct effect on the water quality improvement. Second of all, this will be a 
voluntary contract. So whoever thinks that it is profitable and are willing to put effort, 
will join the contract. Third, it is a group contract. This is very appropriate when individual contributions cannot be determined such as nonpoint sourse pollution. Fourth, 
it has a fixed payment. One of the most important parts of this kind of contract is to have 
enough incentive to participate. Having fixed payment can increase the participation but 
also cause the free-rider problem. Fifth, in order to prevent free-rider problem, we have 
included peer pressure and social sanctions concepts in our model. Basically, joint 
liability in payments leads agents to peer monitoring/pressure. Peer monitoring can 
discourage agent to shirk and induce them to put high effort. This can allow the principal 
to have some fixed payment in the contract without having any moral hazard problem in 
order to increase the participation. Results show that this kind of mechanisms may work 
under some conditions. Once the principal carefully analyze the case and specifies the 
variables correctly, agents can have enough incentive for not to shirk and put always high 
effort. This will make both the principal and the agents better off. 
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